Friday, May 21, 2010

African Logic

INTRODUCTION

In answering the question of the existence of African logic, one will readily expect one of these two questions, namely; whether it is or not. Logic itself, being a primary instantiation or extraction of philosophy will pre-empt that the answer be philosophical perhaps, with reasons for the claim. A lot already has been said about the non-existence of African logic.

As response to these claims, this presentation shall take into cognizance, various ideas and practices, so as to tell us whether or not there is an African logic. However, in achieving this, the expectations of this paper are as follows:

1. Conceptualization of concepts

2. Western conception of logic

· Aristotle and logic

· Aristotle and the world of reasoning

3. Argument of no African logic

· Levy Bruhl, Durkheim & Senghor

· Other philosophers.

4. Responses to the arguments

· Peter Winch’s claim

· Other responses

· The unique way of thinking in Africa.

5. Evaluation and Conclusion.

WHAT IS LOGIC

The term logic comes from the Greek word logos. The variety of senses that logos possesses may suggest the difficulties to be encountered in characterizing the nature and scope of logic. Among the partial translations of logos, there are “sentence,” “discourse,” “reason,” “rule,” “ratio,” “account” (especially the account of the meaning of an expression), “rational principle,” and “definition.” Not unlike this proliferation of meanings, the subject matter of logic has been said to be the “laws of thought” “the rules of right reasoning,” “the principles of valid argumentation,” “the use of certain words labeled ‘logical constants',” “truths (true propositions) based solely on the meanings of the terms they contain,” and so on.

It is relatively easy to discern some order in the above array of explanations. Some of the characterizations are in fact closely related to each other. When logic is said, for instance, to be the study of the laws of thought, these laws cannot be the empirical (or observable) regularities of actual human thinking as studied in psychology; they must be laws of correct reasoning, which are independent of the psychological idiosyncrasies of the thinker. Moreover, there is a parallelism between correct thinking and valid argumentation: valid argumentation may be thought of as an expression of correct thinking, and the latter as an internalization of the former. In the sense of this parallelism, laws of correct thought will match those of correct argumentation. With this in hand, we can now proceed to see what African logic is like.

AFRICAN LOGIC

The term African logic and logic in Africa are two terms, though inter-related, posses an icon of contradiction laying the two side by side in the realm of thorough philosophical interrogation. While ‘logic in Africa’ designates any logical activity done within the margins of the geographic Africa; that is, logic seen in the light of a universal practice, which has specific paradigm or laws that makes a wholistic practice, which does not differ from place to place, culture to culture, etc. African logic on the other hand, is a specific kind of logic, which has its focus on the nature of African reality; that is, it includes the humanistic tendencies and approach that deals with the African thinking and reasoning.

Nonetheless, for any discipline to be called African logic, it must meet the criteria of origin, domicile, and interest. By origin, we mean that it evolves with the people as they grow up and become part and parcel of them. By domicile, we mean that this is only inherent and peculiar to the African soil (that is, it is always found in Africa). By interest, we mean that it focuses its tentacles of concentration, interrogation and meditation on the logical peculiarities of the geographic Africa and the peoples of Africa. It is only when these three criteria are crystallized and melted into one pot of unism that the discipline can rightly be called African logic.

With these preliminary remarks, it is hoped that the concept of African logic is clear and to some extent will guide us through without unnecessarily creating any cobweb in our mental skies

WESTERN CONCEPTION OF LOGIC

No doubt that this paper is treating African logic, but for proper achievement of purpose, it will be pertinent to grasp a clue of what the westerners term logic to be, since western logic is conceived to be the most prominent form of logic that has proved itself and still used as a measure of logical formality within the western part of the world and even to other parts of the world. This logic in question is no other than the famous Aristotelian logic.

ARISTOTLE AND LOGIC

No history of Aristotle is important to us here other than, that he was from Greece and lived 384BC to 322 BC and that he formulated the so much proclaimed logic which stands head-high in western philosophy. The summary of Aristotelian formal logic is brought to bear by his three fundamental laws, namely; the law of Identity, the law of Contradiction and the law of Excluded Middle.

The first law states that a thing is always equal to or identical with itself. The second law states that a thing cannot be unequal or different from itself. On the other hand, the third law continues the former two laws; it states that if a thing is equal to itself, it cannot be unequal or different from itself. That is, if ‘A’ equals ‘A’, it cannot equal ‘non A’. To simplify these three laws we can say what they represent simply means is that, what is, simply is and must be as it is.

Stemming from the above, we see that our conceptual experiences impel us to accept the law of identity as a father of theories. But common sense experience teaches us that continuity exist in nature and human beings have choice, than to conform to this natural inclination. Thus the significance of the formalization of the reasoning process is clear from what is said below;

The law of identity directs us to recognise likeness amidst diversity, permanence amidst changes, to single out the basic peculiarities between and apparently different instances and entities, to uncover the real bonds of unity between them; to trace the connections between different and consecutive phases of the same phenomena. That is why the discovery and the application of this law was so epoch-making in the history of scientific thought and why Aristotle, is honored continuously for grasping its extraordinary significance. And this also why the western philosophers believe that mankind must continue to think and act in accordance with this law of formal logic. (Novack, 1971:21).

Thus it becomes apparently visible that the overwhelming influence of a formalized reasoning has colonized reasoning that the experience that suppose to go along with reason has been put to fix. Furthermore, scholars have the inclination in insisting that a rational or intelligent action is that which conforms to Aristotle’s rule of formal logic. This forms the fulcrum of western rationality, perhaps western logic.

DEBATE ON THE EXISTENCE OF AFRICAN LOGIC

ARGUMENT OF NO AFRICAN LOGIC

Many scholars especially Europeans have argued that there is no African logic. It is noteworthy that this assertion is not only by philosophers but scholars of other discipline. If we concern ourselves with the works of classical anthropologists dating back to the intellectual school led by Tylor, we discover Levy Bruhl and Durkheim; these two prominent sociologists measure the rationality of any thought system according to its conformity with the laws of Aristotelian logic. This position is more particular to Levy Bruhl. In order to achieve this, he classifies the human society into two categories namely; those with primitive mentality and those with a civilized mentality. To explain this division, he says that, those who have primitive mentality are pre-logical; pre-logical in the sense that they are unscientifically oriented. While on the other hand, those who have civilized mentality, are logical, since they reason within the laws of Aristotelian formal logic. In other words, they are scientifically oriented. According to Levy Bruhl, Africans fall within the terrain of those with primitive mentality. Hence he sympathizes with Africa for failing to fall into the class of those with civilized mentality.

In his book, ‘La Mentalite Primitive’ he denies equating pre-logical with alogical or anti-logical rather he says:

Pre-logical does not mean illogical or anti-logical. Pre-logical applied to primitive mentality, means simply that it does not go out of its way as we do to avoid contradiction but it does not present the same logical requirements.

However, he does not deny the existence of logic in that society and does not seem to insist too firmly on the qualitative peculiarities of mode of thought. The logic he finds in this system is still too rudimentary and infantile to speak of. Nonetheless this view point of his is also from the fact that he studied traditional thought as a formal logician. This is why he finds it contradictory when an African says “crocodiles are spirit”. According to him such laws are intelligible when they only form part of a mystical participation.

SENGHOR

Just like his contemporary, Senghor attributes some form of reasoning to Africa, but this reasoning, cannot differentiate between the organic and the inorganic, between the subject and the object or between the law and himself. So what Levy Bruhl calls ‘logic of sentiments’, Senghor calls ‘intuitive reasoning’. Consciously or unconsciously, Senghor appeals or affirms Levy Bruhl’s conclusion that African logic is still infantile or rudimentary to be spoken of.

Analogous to the above, another argument that comes up is whether the discipline of African logic possesses any form of rationality despite the fact that logic is itself rational. Senghor revolves around the question whether what is labeled African logic is fit to be said to be logical/rational or not. Accordingly, this thinking holds on the principle of Aristotelian formal logic earlier on explained with the westerners, seeing it as the only way through which all human experiences across culture should be exposed and assessed.

RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENT

To every action, there must be a reaction which is equal or even greater than the antecedents. Just as many have said that there is no African logic, we can also confidently say there is African logic, first by debunking its contrary claims and making an exploration into the thought system of the African.

At this stage of this paper we refuse to agree with Levy Bruhl’s argument, that there is no such thing as logic or rationality, among Africans. To effectively argue this, we will employ the thesis of Peter Winch on the issue of “forms of life”, which has helped to show that of all that has been used to counter argue the existence of an African logic, are all by their nature, ontologically western. According to Winch, any attempt to assess the rationality of traditional mode of thought (logic) with the logic of science, should be ignored. For him, science operates with its own concept of reality that is determined by a set of paradigms. In a different form of life, such a language of discourse is not applicable. According to Winch, there are different forms of life, and each has its own criteria for assessing what is logically intelligible and what is not. Peter Winch defines a form of life as a set of linguistic rules and practices with specific procedures for judging the validity or otherwise of given claims. In relation to traditional thoughts, Winch thinks that claims involving magic and witchcraft cannot be assessed in terms of either scientific conception or scientific standards of rationality. All such magico-religious beliefs have their own language of discourse and they can therefore be only assessed as intelligible or unintelligible when analyzed within the context of occurrence, that is within the context they are held.

Following from the above claims of Peter Winch, we can effectively argue that as far as logic or rationality is concerned, it is culture or context dependent. This will mean that for us to confirm or affirm that a given claim is logical or illogical; we must first note the context of which we assess it. Therefore, for one to say that there is no such thing as African logic, means to say that there is no culture in Africa and also goes further to affirm that the continent of Africa, lacks a form of life. For it is only in this way that one can comfortably disagree to the existence of an African logic. But this is not the case since in Africa; there are certain beliefs that are held, and for a people to hold a belief, is also for that people to have a culture. And this will also follow that for there to be a culture there equally will be a form of life.

Furthermore, if we try to claim that that which we portray as Africa today, never existed prior to colonialism and as such there should be no claim of a culture, a form of life and by extension an African logic. This in itself can also be argued in the light of the fact that the only reason why Africa was made as it is now in the colonial era was because the people of present of Africa had some characteristic feature which they share in common of such characteristics include the fact that they reason in like sense and this in fact will imply that there is a thought pattern in Africa, which in turn is logic.

Africans as we are have particular ways in which we think, and there are certain criteria, that an African looks at, to judge a given claim to be valid or invalid. Validity here will mean that for anything to be considered as valid or correct within the African cosmology, it must meet certain criteria. For instance, the belief of witchcraft in Africa can only be said or agreed to be valid, if and only if what is acclaimed to witchcraft in Africa, truly meets the necessary criteria of what is laid down by Africans as witchcraft. This will mean that since in Africa, there is the belief that there is life force in whatever exist, be it living or non-living. Though this may run contrary to what the westerners will believe based on the Aristotelian formal logic that they uphold, which by its nature, is purely a scientific logic, which can only hold sway in the physical terrain. Therefore if this is the case, we can now reaffirm that as far as logic is concerned, it is context and culture dependent for even if we claim it to be an objective concept since we all are humans and humans are rational therefore it can also still be that all humans reason in the same way. But this as it is, cannot be affirmed since humans by our nature are different from one another and this will mean that though we are all rational, we still have different pattern of thinking so that what one may see as intelligible, can also be seen as irrational and unintelligible by another. Therefore if this is agreed upon then, we the members of this group, stand to affirm that as far as African philosophy is concern, there is an African logic.

CONCLUSION

Though this paper may not have fully exhausted this topic of the existence of African logic, it will also be of use to all since in the cause of this work, we have tried to show the different stand bringing to the fore that there is a debate concerning the existence of an African logic. This paper also have allowed us to show that whatever position one may take, it will all bore down to the fact that there is still an African logic. For as the paper clearly states; thinking, rationality or logic if you like, is culture or context dependent.

Furthermore, this paper has also shown to show that although we tend to agree that there is a standard for what is logical and that all that will claim to be logical must meet this given standard, still will not be an accepted standard, if this criteria, is given from a different ontological setting. Therefore, we the members of this group have agreed that for anything to be seen as logical or for any claim to be regarded as valid or invalid, it must conform to the ontological reality of the context or culture from which it is assessed. So, we have agreed to see the sense of logic from this angle, even if there may be other perspective from which others might see it, for this is a philosophical discourse, which can be criticized at any point in time. For us, there is an African logic, or if you like, logic that is ontologically African. But we would not stop at this juncture, without living a question, for the question is more important in a philosophical discourse than the answer.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

· Uduigwomen Andrew F. (Ed), footmarks on African philosophy; Lagos: Obaroh and Ogbinaka Ltd, 2002

· Oladipo O.; The idea of African philosophy, Ibadan; Notecula Publishers, 1992

· Bodunrin P.O, (Ed); philosophy in Africa: Trends and Perspective; Ife, University of Ife Press, 1985

· Wiredu K.; Philosophy and An African Culture, London; Cambridge University Press, 1980.

· Wright Richard (Ed),; African Philosophy: An Introduction.; New York; University of America, 1984

· John S. Mbiti; African Religion and Philosophy.; London; Heineman 1969.

· Bertrand Rusell; History of Western Philosophy,; London; George Allen and Union Publishers, 1946

· Omorogbe J.I ; Knowing Philosophy,; Lagos; Joja Educational Research and Publishers Ltd., 1990

· Houtonji Paulin S. ; African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, London; Hutchinson and Co. Publishers, 1983.

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